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------------S- -·nrerne Co'-u:-~~ · Clerk, ... ~.,. 
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H. WHITE, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARXOLD SIEYERTS, JOHN 
SIEYERTS, ALBERT SIEVERTS, 
J~\~IES SIEYERTS and ABRAHAM 
SIEYERTS, JR., a co-partnership do-
ing business as IXLAND DEVELOP-
~IBXT CO~IP 4-\.KY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 7889 
-vs.-
DOXALD ~L WHITE and LAVINE 
H. \\~HITE, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is believed that a brief resume of the facts might 
be helpful to the proper presentation of the respondents' 
argument. Appellants have a rather lengthy statement of 
facts which includes copious quotations from the plead-
ings and a good deal of argument. It is more in the na-
ture of an argument than a narrative statement of what 
the evidence and testimony showed. 
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On or about June· 7, 1950, the appellants and the 
respondents entered into a uniform real estate contract 
for the sale of certain real property described in it. The 
purchase price was $18,000.00, $7,000.00 of which was 
to be paid upon execution of the contract. This amount 
was paid. By December 15, 1950, $15,000.00 was to have 
been paid, including the $7,000.00 down payment. There-
maining $3,000.00 was to have been paid on or before 
June 7, 1951. The plaintiffs did not make payments in 
accordance with the contract. In January of 1951 a con-
versation was had between the respondents and Abraham 
Sieverts, one of the appellants, respecting the money 
which should have been paid on the contract by December 
15, 1950. (R. 106) As a result of this conversation $2,000.-
00 was paid to the respondents. Payments of $1,000.00 
were made thereafter in the months of February, March, 
April and May, 1951, by the appellants. Appellants claim 
an oral1nodification as a result of this discussion, which 
is denied by the respondents. (R. 106) 
No payment was made by the appellants after Ma~· 
of 1951. By a letter dated July 19, 1951 (R. 8) the ap-
pellants were notified by the respondents that they were 
delinquent, and that unless the remaining balance on the 
contract together with the interest were paid within 20 
days of the date of the letter the contract would be can-
celled. 
The respondents heard nothing from appellants until 
August 7, 1951, about the letter of July 19th. On that 
date a telephone conversation was had between McKay 
Loveland, a real estate dealer and the agent of the ap-
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pellants, and i\Irs. 'Yhite, one of the respondents, re-
specting the demand for payment previously referred to. 
Mrs. White told Loveland and Abraham Sieverts, who 
was listening to the conversation on another extension, 
that she did not want a check, but wanted cash, and that 
upon receipt of the Inoney she would execute a deed to 
the property. (R. 58) 
~\.ppellants did not on August 7, 1951 deliver to the 
respondents cash, a cashier's check or a check of any kind, 
nor did they offer to do so. After five o'clock on August 
7, 1951, the appellants, with the help of Loveland, devised 
a letter which was sent by registered mail to the respond-
ents, stating that a check of the Inland Development Com-
pany for the balance of the purchase price was prepared 
and available for respondents. The check was not sent 
with the letter, which was delivered on August 8, 1951. 
Delivery of the letter was refused by respondents. 
Thereafter, on August 13, 1951, a notice of cancella-
tion of the contract (Exhibit C, R. 9) was served upon ap-
pellants by the sheriff of Salt Lake County, by delivering 
it to James Sieverts, one of appellants. 
Thereafter appellants instituted suit for specific 
performance of the contract, and respondents answe·red 
and counterclaimed for cancellation of the contract and 
for forfeiture. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
AND DID NOT FAIL TO MAKE FINDINGS ON ANY RELE-
VANT OR DETERMINATIVE ISSUE. 
In the argument upon Point No. 1 relied ·on by the 
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appellants, the statement is made that a party is entitled 
to have the court make findings of fact on relevant and 
material issues with respect to his theory of the case. 
In argument upon this point, five separate failures 
of the court to make findings are set forth. With respect 
to the obligation of a trial court to make findings, a 
general statement of the law might be helpful. 
A fair statement of the law is to be found in Ameri-
can Juris prudence, Vol. 53, paragraph 1143, under the 
heading of trials. The· following is quoted from that para-
graph: 
"It has been said that if the findings of fact 
made by the trial court leave some issue or mate-
rial fact undetermined, such issue or fact will be 
regarded as not proved by the party having the 
burden of proof. Accordingly, where a special 
finding is silent as to a fact the existence of which 
is necessary to make out the plaintiff's case, the 
presumption is that the fact did not exist. Again, 
where there is a decision against the party and a 
failure to find on a counterclaim interposed by 
him, this has been held to amount to an implied 
finding against such counterclaim. On the other 
hand, a refusal to find a fact requested is not equi-
valent to an affirmative finding to the contrary. 
If it were, a judgment might be based upon a deci-
sion made up wholly of refusals. 
"Where there is no express finding as to a 
fact but there· is a finding as to another fact which 
necessarily determines the existence of the former, 
this is sufficient as an implied finding. Accord-
ingly, where findings made necessarily negative 
the allegation of a party concerning certain 
matters, the failure of the court to find expressly 
and specifically on such matters is not error. 
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. . ... 
.. A8 has been noted, a general finding imports 
a finding of eyery subsidiary fact necessary to 
that re8ult." 
The law appears to be that if the court does not make 
findings upon eYery specific facet of the theory of a party 
to a law suit, that these are denied by implication, which 
is the case with respect to those failures complained of 
by the appellants. 
This court has supported the general propositioH 
of law hereinabove set forth in various decisions. 
Statements of the necessity for the trial court to 
find specifically on every issue presented by the plead-
ings of both sides, and whether failure to do so is error 
is commented on in Skliris v. Melis, 170 P. 968. The 
question involved in that case was whether there had 
been a valid legitimate assignment of a judgment from 
Nick l\Ielis to his brother, Gust Melis. It was contended 
by the appellants in that case that the assignment was 
sham and fraud and was not made for good consideration. 
The trial court found a valid assignment, and conversely 
did not find specifically with respect to the contention of 
fraud, 'Sham and deceit. The trial court's failure to make 
a specific finding with respect to that matter was assigned 
as error. This court held that it was not error, and Mr. 
Justice :McCarty in the opinion, at page 969 of 170 P., 
has the following to say: 
"\Yhere, as in the case at bar, the court makes 
affirmative findings of fact on the material issues, 
in favor of one of the parties to an action or pro-
ceeding-, which findings are inconsistent with and 
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are necessarily a complete negative of the truth 
of the matte·r set forth in the pleadings of the 
other party, the failure of the court, to expressly 
and specifically find on the n1atters the truth of 
which is thus negatived is not error. Snelgrove 
v. Earl, 17 Utah 321, 53 Pac. 1017; Bowers v. Cot-
trell, 15 Idaho 221, 96 Pac. 936; Henderson v. 
Reynolds, 57 Or. 186, 110 Pac. 979; Fox v. Haar-
stick, 156 U.S. 67 4, 15 Sup. Ct. 457; 39 L. Ed. 576; 
38 Cyc. 1953, 1964." 
A similar problem was raised in the case of Sidney 
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 67 P. (2d) 632. In that 
case the defendant had the plaintiff build a special trailer 
according to certain specifications. The plaintiff, builder 
of the trailer, failed to follow the specifications and the 
trailer was unusable by the defendant. The plaintiff 
sued for the purchase price of the trailer. A question 
arose as to whether the defendant had waived his right 
to insist upon the original specifications. This position 
was taken by the plaintiffs in their pleadings. The trial 
court failed to make a specific finding on this matter, 
held for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Among 
the errors assigned was the failure of the trial court 
to make a specific finding on the matter of the waiver. 
This court, in an opinion by Judge Hanson, held that 
failure to make such a finding was not error. At page 638 
of 67 P. ('2d) the court had the following to say: . 
"The findings of the court reflect the sub-
stance of the evidence outlined by us, and, in our 
opinion, are sufficiently supported by the evidence 
and are sufficient to suprport the judgment of the 
court. The plaintiff's assignments of error relat-
ing to the sufficiency of the evidence, therefore, 
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are oYerruled. \Ye are also of the opinion that the 
findings of the trial court reflecting the evidence 
ahoYe referred to necessarily negative the allega-
tions of plaintiff's reply that defendant waived 
the stipulation as to weight and is estopped to rely 
thereon. In such case 'the failure of the court to 
expressly and specifically find on' such matters 
is not error. Skliris Y. ~felis, 51 Utah 391, 170 P. 
968." 
The plain i1nplica tion of the general statement of 
law and these rases is that if the trial court doe·sn't be-
lieve the contentions which appear in the pleadings of one 
party or the other, he may make findings in accord with 
the theory and contentions of the other party. The fail-
ure to make a specific finding with respect to every con-
tention of the losing party is not error. 
The appellants refer to five specific things upon 
which they contend the trial court should have made find-
ings. As indicated above, the respondents contend that 
no findings specifically showing these issues were neces-
sary, but respondents believe a brief comment upon these 
five subsections under Point No. 1 in appellants' brief 
might be helpful. 
The first failure complained of is that the trial court 
didn't make a finding "as to whether there was a modi-
fication, oral or by operation of law, of the original con-
tract." 
The finding made by the trial court that the original 
contract was entered into, that the appellants did not 
abide hy it, and the decree cancelling the contract indicate 
clearly that the court found no oral modification or modi-
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fication by operation of law. 
Any modification at all was denied by the respond-
ent, Lavine White. The only important evidence offered 
by the appellants with respect to a modification is in the 
testimony of Abraham Sieverts. (R. 106) The follow-
ing question and answer appear in the transcript: 
"Q. All right. Now, what was discussed on 
that time~ Will you tell us what the Whites said 
and what you said in reference to this contract? 
"A. Said part of the con tract there had to be 
paid up, of which we or I told them that we would 
have to make different negotiations; and they 
mentioned the fact that they couldn't do it or 
didn't want to do it, and it was just a matter of 
discussion on that same thing I just mentioned, 
and so we did come to an agreement of giving 
them-to give her two thousand dollars and then 
give her a thousand dollars a month, of which she 
was more or less agreed; and as they left the 
office, I told Don and Lavine White if they were 
not, then do not cash the check and we will have to 
make other arrangements." 
It is abundantly clear from the colloquy between 
counsel and one of the appellants that there was no oral 
modification. Even the statement of Abraham Sieverts 
indicates that other arrangements would have to be 
made and not that a modified con tract was then entered 
into. Certainly this amounts to no more than a unilateral 
attempt by Sieverts to effect a modification. 
Appellants contend that the court failed to make a 
finding respecting whether the defendants and respond-
ents tendered a deed and whether such tender was made 
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in such manner as to place plaintiffs in ctefault. 
It is the contention of the respondents that a deed 
was tendered and that they had the ability to execute a · 
good and sufficient warranty deed in accordance with the 
contract. Respondents further contend that their tender 
of a deed was entirely sufficient to place the plaintiffs 
in default. 
The reasons for these contentions on the part of the 
respondents are more fully and completely set forth in the 
argument on Point X o. 3 herein. 
Appellants complain that the trial court failed to 
make a finding as to whether the defendants and respond~ 
ents objected to the form or sufficiency of the tender 
of the balance of the purchase price. 
As previously noted, the findings of the trial court 
are sufficient and it was not necessary that a specific 
finding with respect to that matter be made. 
The record, however, is replete with refusals on the 
part of the respondent, Lavine White, to accept a check 
in payment of the balance of the purchase price. In the 
testimony of McKay Loveland (R. 58) there appears the 
statement that Mrs. White would be willing to sign a deed 
if she got the money. It should be noted that Loveland 
was an important witness for the appellants. At another 
place in his testimony Loveland is recalling a conversa-
tion between Abraham Sieverts and Lavine White (R. 58) 
during which Abraham Sieverts said "Will you take a 
check" and her answer was "No, I want cash." 
It is worthy of notice that in the testimony of Abra-
ham Sieverts one of the appellants, there is another 
' 
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reference to a co~versation between Abraham Sieverts 
and Lavine White. (R. 108) The following question was 
asked Abraham Sieverts by Mr. Burton: 
"What was said as to the manner in which you 
were to pay her in the conversation that day?" 
Abraham Sieverts made the following answer: 
"She did say that-she says-I says, we will 
have a check here for you. She says, I don't wan!: 
your check." 
The record contains a great many other references 
to the objection to taking a check and refusal to take a 
check by the respondents. No useful purpose would be 
served here by multiplying examples of the objections. 
Appellants further complain that no finding was 
made as to whether the defendants wilfully avoided pay-
ment by the plaintiffs of the unpaid balance of the pur-
chase price. There is absolutely no basis for the court 
to have made such a finding and there is no evidence in 
the record that the defendants wilfully avoided receiving 
the purchase price. 
On the contrary, the record clearly shows that the 
purchase price in a form acceptable to the defendants was 
never offered to them. It is not contradicted that on the 
8th day of August, 1951, there was delivered to the resi-
dence of the Whites a registered letter, delivery of whirh 
was refused. It is also uncontradicted that the letter con-
tained nothing but a notice that a check of Inland De-
velopment Company in the amount of the balance of the 
purchase pri'ce was available. It has already been made 
clear that this mode of payment had been specifically 
10 
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and vigorously rejected by the defendants, and particu-
larly Lavine White. There is nothing in the record to 
show that at any time on August 8, 1951, or thereafter 
until depo'Sitions of the defendants were taken that an 
offer of cash or a certified check was ever made. It 
therefore becomes clear that payment was not wilfully 
avoided by the defendants, because payment in proper 
form was never timely offered to them. 
The appellants complain that no finding was made 
as to whether title to the property was sufficient or as to 
whether defendants were ready, willing or able to submit 
evidence of title. 
Appellants in their brief set forth in full Finding 
No.16 (R. 238), which reads as follows: 
·'That at the execution of the contract on 
June 7, 1950 the buyers exercised their option to 
receive such evidence of title and that an abstract 
covering approximately 10 acres of· the property 
described in said contract was furnished to the 
agent of the plaintiffs, one McKay Loveland, and 
. continued for plaintiffs at the request of their 
agent, the said McKay Loveland, and that a re--
quest for a policy of title insurance on the remain-
ing land covered by the contract was made by the 
said .JicKay Loveland, as agent of the plaintiffs, 
and that the said 1IcKay Loveland charged the 
defendants in the closing statement that was sub-
mitted to the defendants at the time of the execu-
tion of the contract for the continuation of the 
abstract and the title insurance and that the said 
MciCay Loveland was paid for both the continua-
tion of the abstract and the necessary title insur-
nnce by the defendants at the time of the execu-
tion or' the contract." 
11 
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This seems perfectly clear that the court found from 
the evidence that at the time of entering into the contract 
the plaintiffs exercised their option to have evidence of 
title submitted to them. It should be noted in this con-
nection that McKay Loveland was the agent for the plain-
tiffs. (R. 77) During cross-examination of Loveland he 
was asked "You began by being the agent for the 
Sieverts f' He answered "That's correct." In the testi-
mony of Abraham Sieverts there is a statement that 
Loveland was their agent. (R. 113, 114) 
The record shows that at the time the contract was 
entered into Loveland, as agent of the appellants, had the 
abstract of title (Exhibit G) which covered the major 
portion of the property involved. It appears from the 
record (R. 80) that the abstract was brought up to date 
by Loveland, the appellants' agent. 
The record shows that a preliminary report for a 
policy of title insurance covering the remainder of the 
property described in the contract and not cove·red by 
the abstract (Exhibit G) was ordered and was available 
to Loveland and to the Sieverts. It appears further that 
Loveland. charged the defendants and respondents the 
sum of $38.50 for the policy of title insurance and that 
he was paid the money. (R. 81) It further appears that 
Loveland charged the defendants for bringing the ab-
stract up to date, and that he was paid the sum of $24.25 
for that. (R. 81) 
It further appears that at the time the contract was 
signed the abstract was available to both Loveland and 
Abraham Sieverts, and that they then had an opportunity 
12 
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to exmnine it. ( R. 83) 
In the light of the testimony by Abraham Sieverts 
and LoYeland, both witnesses for the appellants, herein-
above referred to, there was ample evidence from which 
the trial court could find, as it did, that the appellants 
exercised their option to be presented with evidence of 
title at the time the contract was signed. 
POINT NO.2. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE A GOOD AND SUFFI-
CIENT TENDER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE PURCHASE 
PRICE BY CHECK OR OTHERWISE. 
Appellants in their brief argued in Point No. 2 that 
where no objection is raised to a tender by check, such a 
tender is sufficient. 
It is undisputed that the appellants were notified 
by respondents that they were in default on their con-
tract and that unless the balance of the purchase price 
was paid within twenty days from the date of the notice, 
the con tract would be cancelled. 
As previously stated in the argument of Point No. 
1 in this brief, the record contains many references to 
the objection of the respondents to payment by check. 
(R. 72, 73, 58 and 107) No necessary or useful purpose 
would be served by repeating verbatim these statements 
which appear in the transcript. 
In their argument of Point No.2, the appellants refer 
to the case of Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 
48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283. This is the only Utah case cited 
in support of that point. 
We desire to call the court's attention to the Hirsh 
13 
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case for the purpose of showing that the present Utah 
statute, 104-54-10, is the same with respect to the objec.: 
tion to a tender as the statute that was in force in 1916 
when the Hirsh case was decided. 
Respondents have no quarrel with the doctrine an-
nounced by that case or the statutory provision. It simply 
does not apply to the case at bar for the reason, as ·we 
have obse,rved many times, that abundant and continu-
ous objections were made by the respondents to payment 
by check. 
Appellants cite numerous cases in support of their 
position and refer to a statement with respect to the ten-
der of checks found in 62 C.J. 668. Respondents do not 
disagree with the proposition supported by these cases 
and text references, but again state that they do not apply 
to this case. 
In argument on this point appellants cite the case 
of Neal v. Finley, 136 Ky. 346, 124 S..W. 348. A quotation 
from that case appears in appellants' brief and we feel 
it is worthwhile repeating: 
"It is true that ordinarily a tender of payment 
in any way than by legal-tender money is not good. 
But the parties Inay waive that feature of the law. 
If tender is made in bank bills, or check, the tender 
will. be deemed sufficient (provided, in case of 
check, the drawer has sufficient funds in the bank 
to meet the payment), unless the refusal is based 
upon the ground that the tender is not in lawful 
money." 
We wish specifically to call the court's attention to 
the statement by the Kentucky court that tender by check, 
if not objected to, will be deemed sufficient provided, in 
14 
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the case of check, the drawer has s~tff·icient funds in the 
ba.nk to meet the payment. 
It is necessary· in this connection to call the court's 
attention to the fact that the check of Inland Development 
Company which appellants stated they were willing to 
submit was not good at the time it was written, or at any 
time within the time given the appellants to pay the bal-
ance of the purchase price or have their contract can-
celled. (R 207) 
We desire to invite the court's attention to the testi-
mony of Mr. Soelberg (R. 207), a witness called by the 
respondents. He testified that he was teller at the Cen-
tral Branch of the Continental Bank, where the Inland 
Development Company account was maintained. (R. 205) 
He testified (R. 205) that on August 7, 1951 and August 
8, 1951 the balance in that account was $91.99. The 
check which appellants offered to give respondents in 
payment of the balance of the purchase price was 
$5265.03. Mr. Soelberg further testified (R. 207) that if 
that check had been presented for payment on Augu'St 
7th or August 8th, 1951, it would not have been paid. 
Abraham Sieverts testified that he had available 
to him money from certain other accounts, but upon cross-
examination testified that he did not know (R. 223-4) 
how much money was in any of the other accounts. It 
would seem to make little difference, however, since no 
check on any other account maintained by the Sieverts 
under any other business name was offered to the re-
spondents. 
In view of the status of the account upon which that 
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check was drawn, the statement in the Neal case that suf-
ficient funds must be available to pay the check before it 
will be considered good tender becomes important. 
Respondents also invite the court's attention to the 
early Utah case of Hyams v. Bamberger, 36 P. 202. In 
this case the question arose as to whether tender in writ-
ing pursuant to a statute contained in the Laws of 1888 
was sufficient. The pe·rtinent material from that statute 
(Sec. 3964), Laws of 1888, is as follows: 
"An offer in writing to pay a particular sum 
of money* * *is, if not accepted, equivalent to the 
actual production and tender of the money." 
This is not vastly different from the present statu-
tory provision, 104-54-8, UCA, 1943. 
It is extremely significant that the court in the 
Hyams case, speaking through Mr. Justice Bartch, says 
at page 203 of 36 P : 
"A tender in writing under the statute is 
'equivalent to the actual production and tender 
of money'. To have this effect, however, the party 
tendering 'must have the ability to produce it and 
must act in good faith." 
The respondents submit the· record clearly shows that 
at the time there was offered an Inland Development 
Company check to the respondents, the appellants did not 
have the money and did not act in good faith, and for 
that reason their tender was not sufficient, even if it had 
not been objected to by the respondents. As a further 
indication that the appellants did not have the money 
to make payment when they offered to give respondents 
a check and as evidence of their lack of good faith, it is 
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interesting to note that Loveland, their agent, made out a 
check in the sum of $5,000.00 to help "cover" the check 
of the appellants. 
It is significant that Loveland did not have suffi-
cient funds in the account upon which he drew his check 
for $5,000.00 to insure payment. (R. 214, 215, 216, 217) 
In cross-examination of Loveland he was asked "Now, 
but you knew as of the time you drew that check of yours 
that it wasn't any good~" His answer was "No, it was 
good." He was further asked: "You didn't have the 
money in the bank when you drew the check, did you'" 
Answer: "No, but the check wasn't delivered at that time 
either." 
The record shows that at the time Loveland wrote the 
check for $5,000.00 the balance in his account was $721.-
55. (R. 214) It further appears that on the same day, 
August 7, 1951, another check was written by Loveland 
to David L. Boshard for $1981.62_, which would have 
more than exhausted the account. 
After it appeared that Abraham Sie~erts did not 
have sufficient money in his account to make good the 
check he said he was willing to give to the respondents, 
he then testified that he had sufficient money in cash. 
(R. 224-5) No cash, however, was ever offered to the 
respondents and there is no statement in the record any 
place that the appellants made any effort to make pay-
ment in cash or to offer to do so. It further developed 
(R. 224-5) that the cash money Abraham Sieverts claimed 
he had belonged to his father, who was not a party to 
this con tract. 
17 
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From the findings it is clear that the trial court 
simply didn't believe that the Sieve~rts had the money to 
pay the balance of the purchase price. 
POINT NO.3. 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN CANCELLING 
THE CONTRACT OR IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS 
WERE READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO DELIVER A DEED 
AND HAD PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT. 
The trial court made a finding that the defendants 
were in a position and willing to perform on August 7th 
and August 8th, 1951. The following language is found 
in Finding No. 14: 
"That the defendants had performed in ac-
cordance with said Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and on August 7 and August 8, 1951 were ready, 
willing and able to execute a proper deed to plain-
tiffs of all the real property described in said 
con tract." 
It is the position of the respondents that there is 
ample evidence in the record to support this finding and 
to show conclusively that the defendants and respondents 
were prepared to deliver a good and sufficient deed in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract if they had been 
paid the balance of the purchase price. 
Point No. 3 in the appellants' brief pre'Sents the 
proposition that no cancellation should have been ordered 
by the trial court because no tender to the plaintiffs and 
appellants of a deed was ever made. 
The appellants have conveniently set forth on page 
37 of their brief that portion of the contract which is 
important in determining what the seller is required to 
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do. That portion of the contract reads as follows: 
··The seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner 
above Inentioned, agrees to execute and deliver 
to the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient war-
ranty deed • * *" 
The contract plainly says that the seller must e·xe-
cute and deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed 
on receiving the payments. It is not necessary here to 
review previous material appearing in this brief which 
shows that the payment was never made and no legally 
sufficient offer to make payment was ever made. 
In support of Point No. 3 in appellants' brief numer-
ous cases are cited, apparently supporting the proposi-
tion that payment of money and execution of a deed are 
concurrent conditions. Almost without exception these 
cases arose as a result of a suit by the vendor for some 
relief. In this case the original action was brought by 
the vendee. 
In connection with the obligation of the seller to ex-
cute a deed, we desire to call the court's attention to the 
case of Walker v. Hewitt, an Oregon case found at 220 
P. 1-!7. In that case action was brought on a note given 
for the purchase price of real property and assigned 
by the original holder to the plaintiff. The note was not 
paid in accordance with its terms and the question arose 
as to whether there must be concurrent or simultaneous 
exchange of the money and the deed. 
A portion of the contract in that case recites "That 
if the party of the second part (the defendant) shall first 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
make payment", then a warranty deed would be executed 
and delivered. We should like to note that the language 
there is slightly different from the contract in question 
here, but we contend the meaning is the same. In the 
Walker case the court addresses itself to this problem 
in the following language: 
"The object of language is not to conceal 
ideas, but to express, and where an instrument 
provides that one party shall first pay in order 
to be entitled to a deed it is logical to conclude, 
in the absence of other qualifying language, that 
it is intended that the payment must precede the 
giving of the deed. The word 'first' does not mean 
'coincident with,' or 'at the same moment', either 
in law or logic. As the case stands here, the docu-
ment pleaded by defendant says to defendant, in 
effect: 'You must first pay the price evidenced by 
the note, and when that is paid plaintiff must make 
a deed.' But defendant would have us construe 
this language so that the first thing to be done 
or tendered is the deed. It would seem that before 
defendant can be allowed to urge this defense 
to an action on a promissory note he should be re-
quired to plead that he had paid or offered to pay, 
or is ready and willing to perform his part of a 
plain agreement, or show some valid reason why 
he should not do so." 
In this connection we desire to call the court's atten-
tion to the California case of Brant v. Bigler, 208 P. (2d) 
47. In that case an action was brought by the plaintiff 
vendor for a declaration that defendant vendee was in 
default and that a real estate contract should be can-
celled. 
The question arose as to whether a proper deed had 
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been tendered and as to the seller's obligation to make 
such a tender. The court says at page 49 of 208 P. (2d) 
the following: 
""In a contract for the sale of real estate the 
delivery of the deed and the payment of the pur-
chase price are dependent and concurrent condi-
tions. King Y. Stanley, 32 Cal. 2d 584, 590, 197 P. 
2d 321: Cates Y. 11cNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 706, 147 P. 
9-!-!; \Yhittier v. Gormley, 3 Cal. App. 489, 86 P. 
12G; CiY. Code, Sec. 1657. Neither party to such a 
contract can place the other in default unless he 
is able to perform or tender performance. Downer 
Y. Buehrle, 90 Cal. App. 2d ______ , 203 P. 2d 795; 
:JicDonnan v. :Jioody, 50 Cal. App. 2d 136, 122 P. 
2d 639; Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 
123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713, -!3 L.R.A. 199, 69 Am. St. 
Rep. 17. As stated in 55 Am. Jur. 930: '* * *To 
entitle a vendor to d~clare a forfeiture of the con-
tract and retain a deposit or purchase money paid, 
there must have been an offer or ability on his 
part to perform dependent or concurrent stipula-
tions. * * *' " 
In the Brant case it appeared that the seller was 
not able to deliver an unencumbered title without using 
some purchase money which was in escrow. However, the 
important language the court uses is that on the part of 
the vendor there must have been an offer or ability to 
perform. It is the contention of the respondents that no 
question whatever can be raised on the basis of this 
record that they could not have executed a good and suffi-
cient warranty deed as called for by the contract. 
Further in this connection it should be noted that 
since the respondent Lavine White refused to accept a 
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check in payment, and no cash or cashier's check was 
ever delivered or offered, the preparation and physical 
delivery to the appellants of a deed would have been un-
necessary and useless. The proposition that the law will 
not require the doing of a useless act does not require any 
extended discussion here. 
Even if delivery of the purchase price and the deed 
were concurrent conditions of the contract, as contended 
for by the appellants, the fact still remains that no proper 
tender was ever made by the appellants, and they should 
scarcely be able to complain that no deed was ever offer-
ed, in view of the ability of the respondents to perform. 
We invite the court's attention again to the language 
of the contract, which says that the sellers "on receiving 
the payments" agree to execute and deliver a deed. We 
contend that the plain meaning of that provision of the 
contract is that there exists no requirement for the ex-
ecution and delivery of a deed until the money is paid. 
We further contend that the record is unmistakablyclear 
that payment was never made. 
There is an additional and important consideration 
with respect to the obligation of the respondents to exe-
cute and deliver a deed. It appears from an examina-
tion of the testi1nony that Lavine White, one of the re-
spondents, in a conversation with McKay Loveland, the 
appellants' agent, agreed to accept his computation of 
the balance due and that he agreed to prepare a deed. 
(R. 87) The respondent Lavine White said that upon re-
ceiving the money, not a check, she would execute the 
deed to be prepared by Loveland or the Sieverts. (R. 87) 
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A further examination of the transcript shows that 
on August 7, 1951 a deed was prepared for the Sieverts. 
(R. 102) The examination of Mrs. Christopherson, a 
secretary at Inland Realtors, shows that the deed was 
prepared. The following question was asked :Mrs. Chris-
topherson on cross-examination : 
"Q. You can't recall anything of that kind. 
\\T as there any conversation between you and 
~[rs. White on that occasion of August 7, 1951, 
about the necessity for having Mr. White sign the 
deed¥ 
To that question she made the following answer: 
"\Yell, the deed was made out to both-for 
"J[r. and "Jirs. White's signature * * *" (R. 102) 
In the testimony of Abraham Sieverts (R.108) the 
following question was asked by appellants' counsel: 
"Q. Was anything said in that conversation 
about whether you were to pay in cash, by check, 
or how payment was to be made or whether there 
was a deed to be prepared f' 
~fr. Sieverts answered as follows: 
'·A. That was a discussion. I was on the 
other end of the extension. Mr. Loveland dis-
cussed that with her, and that's when she said 
she didn't have a deed, but then she mentioned 
if he would prepare it, that was discussion really 
after this discussion, but that's what it ended up 
to, that if he would prepare it and take care of it, 
why she would come in and get the money." 
:Mr. Sieverts was then asked: 
"Q. You mentioned something about a deed. 
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"\Vas anything said as to whether she had prepared 
a deed ready to deliver to you 1" 
"A. She did not have a deed, and Mr. Love-
land said that he would make up a deed." 
It would seem clear from the record that the respond-
ent Lavine White agreed to execute a deed, which the 
appellants said they would prepare, upon receiving the 
amount of money, which she was willing to permit the 
appellants to compute. It is also clear that she never 
received the money and that the deed prepared by the 
appellants was never presented to her or Mr. White for 
signature. 
In view of the apparent arrangement which existed 
on August 7, 1951, that the appellants would have a deed 
prepared, it would seem to be comp~etely unconscionable 
to permit the appellants now to contend that the respond-
ents should be denied cancellation of the contract because 
of their failure to come personally and hand a deed to 
the appellants. 
The plain fact is that the appellants didn't and 
couldn't perform according to the contract. (Ex. C. R. 60, 
93, 109, 128, 205, 207, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 223, 
224, 225, 228, 229) At the time that the appellants were 
obligated to make final payment or suffer cancellation 
of their contract, the respondents were ready, willing 
and able to perform, and offered to perform if perform-
ance was forthcoming on the part of the appellants. 
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POINT NO.4. 
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AMPLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. 
\Vithout unnecessarily amplifying references to the 
record, it is the position of the respondents that the find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of the trial 
court are amply supported and justified in every par-
ticular. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the reasons set forth in the brief, re-
spondents seriously urge that the decree of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR., 
Attorneys for Defendamts and 
Respondents 
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,I 
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of De-
fendants and Respondents this ---------------- day of January, 
1953. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs a;nd 
Appellants. 
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